The Trial Court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage in 2011. It included the following language re the marital residence: The equitable interest on the property is divided 50-50 between the parties. It is subject to repayment of any loans on the premises. And it is subject to any existing guarantees for which actual payment has actually been made.
In 2018, the Wife filed a petition to revive the dissolution judgment under Section 2-16-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. She asserted that as of May 25, 2018, her equitable interest in the property is still due and owing under the Judgment. In addition, post-judgment interest has accrued thereon at an annual rate of 9%.
Husband filed a motion to dismiss her petition to revive the Judgment. The Trial Court dismissed her petition. Wife appealed.
The Appellate Court agreed with the Trial Court’s decision. It interpreted section 2-1602 as applying only to money judgments against judgment debtors. Here, as the husband points out, the wife did not include an amount of the judgment and accrued interest.
The reason for this omission is obvious. The wife is seeking to revive a judgment that does not impose debt on a judgment debtor. Rather the Judgment declares only an allocation of property between the parties.
The wife did not cite a single case that applies section 2-1602 to any judgment other than a money judgment against a judgment debtor.
We hold that the trial court’s division of the equitable interest in the property, without more, is not a judgment subject to the provisions of section 2-1602 of the Code. To the extent that the interest assigned to the wife even requires revival, any such revival is not available under section 2-1602.
Along those lines, the husband unequivocally conceded at oral argument that the dissolution judgment remains enforceable after seven years. The husband thus concedes that revival is not required here.
In re Marriage of Peck, 2019 IL App (2d) 180598 (April 16, 2019).
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